A central aim of cognitive science is to understand the fundamental mechanisms that enable humans to navigate and make sense of complex environments. In this letter, we argue that computational complexity theory, a foundational framework for evaluating computational resource requirements, holds significant potential in addressing this challenge. As humans possess limited cognitive resources for processing vast amounts of information, understanding how humans perform complex cognitive tasks requires comprehending the underlying factors that drive information processing demands. Computational complexity theory provides a (...) comprehensive theoretical framework to achieve this goal. By adopting this framework, we can gain new insights into how cognitive systems work and develop a more nuanced understanding of the relation between task complexity and human behavior. We provide empirical evidence supporting our argument and identify several open research questions and challenges in applying computational complexity theory to human decision‐making and cognitive science at large. (shrink)

Some partitions of Natural Number set are built through recursive processesgenerating in this manner countable examples of countable and disjoint sets whose unionis a set also countable. This process is constructive, so the Axiom of choice is not used.We provide a PC program that generates one of these special partitions and shows howto generate infinite of them. This line of reasoning can have multiple applications in Settheory and Model theory. We proved that the number of ways to make these partitionsof (...) natural numbers is not countable, there are more of these partitions (named doublycountable) than natural numbers. For each natural number greater than 1, we show aneffective procedure that generates these partitions -/- . (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the notions of adequacy and truth functionality in quantum logic from the point of view of a non-deterministic semantics. We give a characterization of the degree of non-functionality which is compatible with the propositional structure of quantum theory, showing that having truth-functional connectives, together with some assumptions regarding the relation of logical consequence, commits us to the adequacy of the interpretation sets of these connectives. An advantage of our proof is that it is independent of (...) the number of truth values involved, generalizing previous works. We also show the failure of the adequacy of every Nmatrix that is a model of the non-distributive lattice of quantum propositions. En este trabajo discutimos las nociones de adecuación y veritativo-funcionalidad en la lógica cuántica, desde el punto de vista de una semántica no determinista. Damos una caracterización del grado de no-funcionalidad compatible con la estructura proposicional de la teoría cuántica, mostrando que tener conectivos veritativo-funcionales, junto con algunos presupuestos relativos a la relación de consecuencia lógica, nos compromete con la adecuación de los conjuntos de interpretación de estos conectivos. Un punto ventajoso de nuestra prueba es que se independiza de la cantidad de valores de verdad involucrados, generalizando trabajos previos. Probamos también que falla la adecuación de cualquier Nmatriz que sirva como modelo para el retículo no distributivo de proposiciones cuánticas. (shrink)

Tradicionalmente, la relación entre el yo y la experiencia se ha entendido a través de la conciencia, que no solo experimenta sino que también “crea” la experiencia, reflejando una noción arraigada desde Aristóteles. Para la filosofía moderna, la conciencia tiene la capacidad de categorizar y comprender lo percibido. Desde la perspectiva de Levinas, la conciencia y la comprensión se ven como actividad y poder simultáneamente. Sin embargo, surge la pregunta: ¿Es la experiencia de un objeto finito comparable a la experiencia (...) de lo infinito o absoluto? La experiencia religiosa expone al yo a un acontecimiento que no puede ser comprendido por la actividad sintetizadora de la conciencia, según Levinas. Para abordar esta cuestión, utilizaremos conceptos que van más allá de la filosofía clásica, como la trascendencia, la intencionalidad invertida (bouleversé), lo infinito y Dios. Nuestro objetivo es demostrar que la percepción y la representación subjetiva de lo absoluto difiere fundamentalmente de la de cualquier otro fenómeno. Exploraremos con Levinas el uso de un lenguaje no ontológico que pueda expresar lo invisible e “incognoscible” de la experiencia religiosa, sin abandonar el discurso ontológico. En síntesis, busco dilucidar cómo la experiencia del absoluto desafía las categorías tradicionales de la conciencia y la comprensión, y cómo un enfoque filosófico alternativo puede arrojar luz sobre esta compleja dinámica. (shrink)

Does self-control require willpower? The question cuts to the heart of a debate about whether self-control is identical with some psychological process internal to the agents or not. Noticeably absent from these debates is systematic evidence about the folk-psychological category of self-control. Here, we present the results of two behavioral studies (N = 296) that indicate the structure of everyday use of the concept. In Study 1, participants rated the degree to which different strategies to respond to motivational conflict exemplify (...) self-control. Participants distinguished between intra-psychic and externally-scaffolded strategies and judged that the former exemplified self-control more than the latter. In Study 2, participants provided various solutions to manage motivational conflict and rated their proposals on effectiveness. Participants produced substantially more intra-psychic strategies, rated them as more effective, and advised them at a higher rate than externally-scaffolded strategies. Taken together, these results suggest that while people recognize a plurality of strategies as genuine instances of self-control, purely internal exercises of self-control are considered more prototypical than their externally-scaffolded counterparts. This implies a hierarchical structure for the folk psychological category of self-control. The concept encompasses a variety of regulatory strategies and organizes these strategies along a hierarchical continuum, with purely intra-psychic strategies at the center and scaffolded strategies in the periphery. (shrink)

RESUMEN Con frecuencia el amor y la racionalidad se ven como capacidades que fácilmente entran en conflicto, cuando no se consideran por principio opuestas. En este artículo desarrollo algunos puntos esbozados por Harry Frankfurt con el fin de proponer que la relación entre amor y racionalidad no es de simple oposición. Tras ofrecer una caracterización del amor como disposición híbrida de seguimiento múltiple, defenderé que el amor es racional en el siguiente sentido: el amor no es justificable, pero a pesar (...) de ello es una fuente de razones básicas y a veces irresistibles que en buena medida informan el campo de nuestra racionalidad. Esto no significa que el amor sea una base irracional o arracional, o que sea completamente blindado a la razón, sino que en circunstancias específicas tiene sentido someter el amor a escrutinio racional. ABSTRACT Love and rationality are often considered as capacities which easily come into conflict, or are even opposed to one another. In the paper I elaborate some points suggested by Harry Frankfurt in order to propose that the relation between love and rationality is not one of opposition. After offering a characterization of love as a hybrid multi-track disposition, I will argue that love is rational in the following sense: although love is not justifiable, it is nevertheless a source of basic and sometimes irresistible reasons which to a large extent shape the field of our rationality. This does not mean that love is an irrational or arrational foundation, or that it is impervious to reason; it only means that in certain circumstances it makes sense to subject love to rational scrutiny. (shrink)

From our everyday commuting to the gold medalist’s world-class performance, skillful actions are characterized by fine-grained, online agentive control. What is the proper explanation of such control? There are two traditional candidates: intellectualism explains skillful agentive control by reference to the agent’s propositional mental states; anti-intellectualism holds that propositional mental states or reflective processes are unnecessary since skillful action is fully accounted for by automatic coping processes. I examine the evidence for three psychological phenomena recently held to support anti-intellectualism and (...) argue that it supports neither traditional candidate, but an intermediate attention-control account, according to which the top-down, intention-directed control of attention is a necessary component of skillful action. Only this account recognizes both the role of automatic control in skilled action and the need for higher-order cognition to thread automatic processes together into a unified, skillful performance. This applies to bodily skillful action in general, from the world-class performance of experts to mundane, habitual action. The attention-control account stresses that, for intentions to play their role as top-down modulators of attention, agents must sustain the intention’s activation; hence, the need for reflecting throughout performance. (shrink)

This paper critically reviews the principal elements of Searle’s proposed social ontology which is scattered in different books and papers. It discusses the philosophical and conceptual affinities between his philosophy of social reality and sociological theory, and proposes some solutions to dilemmas arising from the strong mentalism of his proposal, using tools from classical sociological theory and the sociology of knowledge. The main objective is to help lay the foundation for a comprehensive social ontology, whose structure is supported by the (...) complementarity between the proposed Searle's social ontology and sociological theory. Este artículo revisa de manera crítica los elementos fundamentales de la propuesta de ontología social de Searle que se encuentra diseminada en sus diversos libros y artículos, abordando analíticamente aquellos aspectos que dan cuenta de las afinidades filosóficas y conceptuales entre su filosofía de la realidad social y la teoría sociológica, utilizando herramientas provenientes de la teoría sociológica clásica y de la sociología del conocimiento. El objetivo principal es contribuir a sentar las basespara una ontología social comprensiva, cuya estructura esté sustentada por la complementariedad entre la propuesta de ontología social de Searle y la teoría sociológica. (shrink)

Researchers often claim that self-control is a skill. It is also often stated that self-control exertions are intentional actions. However, no account has yet been proposed of the skillful agency that makes self-control exertion possible, so our understanding of self-control remains incomplete. Here I propose the skill model of self-control, which accounts for skillful agency by tackling the guidance problem: how can agents transform their abstract and coarse-grained intentions into the highly context-sensitive, fine-grained control processes required to select, revise and (...) correct strategies during self-control exertion? The skill model borrows conceptual tools from ‘hierarchical models’ recently developed in the context of motor skills, and asserts that self-control crucially involves the ability to manage the implementation and monitoring of regulatory strategies as the self-control exercise unfolds. Skilled agents are able do this by means of flexible practical reasoning: a fast, context-sensitive type of deliberation that incorporates non-propositional representations into the formation and revision of the mixed-format intentions that structure self-control exertion. The literatures on implementation intentions and motivation framing offer corroborating evidence for the theory. As a surprising result, the skill of self-control that allows agents to overcome the contrary motivations they experience is self-effacing: instead of continuously honing this skill, expert agents replace it with a different one, which minimizes or prevents contrary motivations from arising in the first place. Thus, the more expert you are at self-control, the less likely you are to use it. (shrink)

Although the link between epistemic and ontological aspects of social reality has always been a problematic issue for the social sciences, this debate loses centrality from the second half of the twentieth century. This article critically reviews the epistemic reasons for that loss, mainly in relation with "hard" constructivism, arguing for the need to return to the ontological debate about sociological foundations. At the same time, it presents a theoretical proposal: social ontology constitutes itself epistemically; that is, the question about (...) "the social" inevitably involves the question about beliefs that constitute it. But social reality is not exhausted in beliefs, since it requires a material component to exist. From this proposal, this paper makes an explicit defense for a realist approach in sociology. To do this, critically reviews John Searle’s social ontology and makes concretes contributions to sociological theory, emphasizing the importance of action, power and causal reciprocity between individual and society, to have a social ontology that shows the specificity of the social. Aun cuando la vinculación entre los aspectos epistémicos y ontológicos de la realidad social ha sido siempre un asunto problemático para las ciencias sociales, este debate pierde centralidad desde mediados del siglo XX. Este artículo revisa críticamente las razones epistémicas de esa pérdida de centralidad, principalmente en relación con el constructivismo "duro", argumentando la necesidad de retomar el debate ontológico acerca de los fundamentos de la disciplina sociológica, al mismo tiempo que plantea una propuesta teórica de elucidación: la ontología de lo social se constituye epistémicamente; vale decir, la pregunta acerca de qué es lo social implica inevitablemente la pregunta por las creencias que lo constituyen. No obstante, la realidad social no se agota en las creencias, puesto que requiere de un componente material para existir. Desde esa propuesta, en una segunda parte, el artículo defiende la necesidad de adoptar una postura realista en sociología. Para ello, revisa críticamente la propuesta de ontología social de Searle y realiza aportes concretos desde la teoría sociológica, concluyendo la importancia de la acción, del poder y de la reciprocidad causal entre individuo y sociedad, para contar con una ontología que dé cuenta de la especificidad propia de lo social. (shrink)

Interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of action in the last few decades has tended toward an intellectualist position, according to which reason is in charge of setting the goals of action. This position has recently been criticized by the revival of anti-intellectualism (particularly from J. Moss’ work), according to which character, and not reason, sets the goals of action. In this essay I argue that neither view can sufficiently account for the complexities of Aristotle’s theory, and propose an intermediate account, which (...) I call indirect intellectualism, that preserves the merits of both traditional interpretations and is able to dispel the problems that trouble each. There is very strong textual evidence for the claim that goal-setting is the task not of reason but of character (and in this anti-intellectualists are right); but reason is able to set goals indirectly by carefully shaping the processes of habituation that constitute a person’s character (and in this intellectualists are right). I argue for this position through a study of the division of labour between character and reason, and through a reconstruction of Aristotle’s conception of habituation. (shrink)

Effort and the feeling of effort play important roles in many theoretical discussions, from perception to self-control and free will, from the nature of ownership to the nature of desert and achievement. A crucial, overlooked distinction within the philosophical and scientific literatures is the distinction between theories that seek to explain effort and theories that seek to explain the feeling of effort. Lacking a clear distinction between these two phenomena makes the literature hard to navigate. To advance in the unification (...) and development of this area, this article provides an overview of the main theories of the nature of effort and the nature of the feeling of effort, and then discusses how efforts and their feelings are related. Two key takeaways emerge. First, there is widespread agreement that efforts are goal-directed actions. Second, one of the main philosophical issues to be decided is whether feelings of effort should be defined by reference to efforts (effort-first approach), or whether efforts are defined by reference to the feeling of effort (feeling-first approach). (shrink)

Self-control, the capacity to resist temptations and pursue longer-term goals over immediate gratifications, is crucial in determining the overall shape of our lives, and thereby in our ability to shape our identities. As it turns out, this capacity is intimately linked with our ability to control the direction of our attention. This raises the worry that perhaps social media are making us more easily distracted people, and therefore less able to exercise self-control. Is this so? And is it necessarily a (...) bad thing? This paper analyzes the nature of attention, its vices and virtues, and what currently available evidence has to say about the effects of social media on attention and self-control. The pattern that seems to be emerging is that, although there is an association between higher use of social media and lower attentional control, we do not yet know whether it is social media use that makes people more distracted, or whether those who use social media the most do so because they are more easily distracted. Either way, the rise of the ‘Web 2.0’ does raise questions about whether the virtues of attention will change in the future, and whether this will bring with it a transformation in the way we shape our selves. (shrink)

The literature on mathematical explanation contains numerous examples of explanatory, and not so explanatory proofs. In this paper we report results of an empirical study aimed at investigating mathematicians’ notion of explanatoriness, and its relationship to accounts of mathematical explanation. Using a Comparative Judgement approach, we asked 38 mathematicians to assess the explanatory value of several proofs of the same proposition. We found an extremely high level of agreement among mathematicians, and some inconsistencies between their assessments and claims in the (...) literature regarding the explanatoriness of certain types of proofs. (shrink)

This article analyzes the philosophical concept of dwelling from the perspective of a media pragmatics. Media pragmatics is presented here as a method that discloses the circular relation between rule-bound practices and the material and technological substrates that support them. This method is put into practice through a comparative philosophical interpretation of two “canonical” models of dwelling: the Greek oikos and the bourgeois home. Because dwelling, as Heidegger argued, is an interface mediating between the “lifeworld” and the “world” while also (...) organizing relations within the lifeworld, it serves here as a privileged object for articulating this method. (shrink)

Which is the best icon of philosophical activity? The Spanish philosopher Garcia Morente analyses three sculptures: Le penseur by Rodin, Il pensieroso by Michelangelo and a sculpture known as El Doncel de Siguenza, in the cathedral of this Castilian town. Morente asserts that the latest reflects better than anyone else the nature of philosophy. In this paper the Morente’s view is rejected and another two ways of representing the philosophical activity are suggested: two ancient paintings that represent more properly the (...) philosophical labour, understood as an unending Socratic dialogue. (shrink)

El artículo indaga en los canales de influencia de los centros de estudio privados o think tanks en el proceso de formación de agenda política en Chile. Un esquema de clasificación para las organizaciones existentes en el país es propuesto, caracterizando los rasgos de centros académicos, centros de apoyo, centros partidarios y centros de gestión. Se busca describir el desenvolvimiento de las distintas organizaciones y determinar el rol de la gestión de saber experto en la definición de asuntos para la (...) agenda política. (shrink)

En el presente artículo abordo la preocupación de la filosofía y la medicina respecto a la vinculación entre dietética y ética. Para lograr aquello, el texto está dividido en cuatro partes. Las tres primeras se enfocan en exponer el pensamiento de Hipócrates, Friedrich Nietzsche y, Michel Foucault y sus reflexiones sobre la salud, la naturaleza humana, el autocontrol de la alimentación y la afirmación de la autonomía. La última sección está dedicada, por un lado, a señalar puntos comunes entre las (...) diversas reflexiones y, por otro, a reivindicar la dietética como problema filosófico y aspecto fundamental de la salud. (shrink)

In recent years, Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni have proposed to understand emotions as embodied evaluative attitudes we take towards objects that figure in nonevaluative representational states. Although their account nicely explains some of the key features that emotions are widely taken to have, it runs into a version of what I call the problem of integration. In the case of the attitudinal view, the integration problem takes the form of explaining how, from the point of view of the subject, (...) the bodily responses that make up the attitude part of the emotion and the representational states that provide the particular object of the emotion come to form an intentionally structured unitary experience, that is, one in which the bodily responses are intentionally directed towards the object. I argue that what explains this integration is the way in which the experience of bodily responses and the experience of the representational states interact. This, I propose, produces what I call an experience of convergence. I also suggest that understanding emotional experience in this way not only solves the problem of the integration but also provides a more solid ground for the claim that emotionsquaembodied attitudes are evaluative. (shrink)

Este artículo indaga sobre el fundamento subjetivo de la percepción del tiempo. El abordaje propuesto recorre la idea husserliana del tiempo como experiencia íntima y flujo permanente. En el camino se aventuran especulaciones sobre la tradición filosófica inclinada a establecer vínculos indisolubles entre la conciencia, el conocimiento del tiempo y la imaginación. El hilo conductor es la correlación existente en la experiencia humana del tiempo a partir de la sucesión mental de esa triada compuesta por el pasado, presente y futuro. (...) Si la identidad humana se compone de procesos de memoria y la anticipación del futuro, entonces cabría preguntarse hasta qué punto las impresiones subjetivas del flujo temporal son fundamento básico de la autopercepción, el yo y cualquier mirada introspectiva. También se incluyen consideraciones sobre los efectos de la temporalidad en la consciencia y la construcción del yo. (shrink)

El artículo analiza la producción de vacunas en el Instituto Bacteriológico del Departamento Nacional de Higiene de Argentina entre 1913 y 1921. Durante estos años, bajo la dirección del bacteriólogo austríaco Rudolf Kraus, la producción de vacunas fue una apuesta central de las actividades del IB. Para ello, presentamos una reconstrucción de los diferentes aspectos sociales y cognitivos involucrados en estos desarrollos, tales como la selección de los productos, de las técnicas utilizadas, del alcance que tuvieron en su distribución y (...) aplicación efectiva, de las expectativas en torno a su aplicación y de las relaciones y antecedentes a nivel internacional de cada caso, entre otras cuestiones. Proponemos, como eje del análisis, que es posible identificar tres tipos de racionalidades que guiaron el desarrollo de las vacunas, ligadas a las retribuciones o diferentes usos que estas podían redituar en los distintos campos o espacios sociales: una médica-sanitaria, una comercial y una científico-técnica, resultado de las diferentes expectativas y demandas que atravesaron al IB. En términos metodológicos, el trabajo se basa en el análisis de diversas fuentes documentales, tales como trabajos científicos y memorias institucionales del IB y del DNH, trabajos de divulgación profesional o educación universitaria de la época, y bibliografía secundaria de la historia de la ciencia y la medicina. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene por objetivo analizar la lectura y los usos que realiza Álvaro García Linera de la sociología de Pierre Bourdieu. El marco teórico para realizar dicho estudio lo constituye la categoría gramsciana de traducción, referida al ejercicio de trazar equivalencias entre diferentes lenguajes científicos, filosóficos, políticos e históricos. La hipótesis que se sostiene es que García Linera traduce los principales conceptos de la sociología de Bourdieu a partir de un doble movimiento. Primero, a través de su puesta (...) en diálogo y fusión con la teoría crítica de Marx y la tradición del marxismo crítico. Segundo, a través del uso de dichos conceptos —una vez pasados por el tamiz del marxismo— para analizar las estructuras simbólicas de la clase obrera boliviana y la etnicidad como principio de distinción y de exclusión política del campesinado-indígena. The present article aims to analyze the reading and uses that Álvaro García Linera makes of Pierre Bourdieu's sociology. The theoretical framework of this study is the Gramscian category of translation, which refers to the exercise of drawing equivalences between different scientific, philosophical, political, and historical languages. The hypothesis that is maintained is that García Linera translates the main concepts of sociology of Bourdieu from a double movement. First, through its dialogue and fusion of these concepts with the theory of Marx and the tradition of critical Marxism. Second, using these concepts —once they have been screened by Marxism— to analyze the symbolic structures of the Bolivian working class and ethnicity as a principle of distinction and political exclusion of the indigenous peasantry. (shrink)

Does the Operative Communicability of the Person Require his Ontological Communicability? Discussion on a Philosophical Dogma of our Time The idea that a substantialist and individualistic philosophy of the person has permeated all of Western metaphysics and has been an obstacle to thinking about communion and intersubjectivity, has become commonplace in contemporary thought. This perspective is problematized here. It is suggested that the different formulations of it, though varied, obeyed a similar argument and dependence on closely related theoretical foundations. This (...) approach is compared with that of ontological personalism and the results of the so-called "post-metaphysical" attempt to achieve a philosophy of communion that overcomes humanism. Interaction with various authors such as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, Foucault, Vattimo, Esposito, Butler, Scheler, among others, illustrate the debate. (shrink)

This paper offers a critical analysis of the logical structure of principles proposed by Robert Alexy and, in particular, of their structure as optimisation commands. Its first part dwells on the question whether the optimisation element in the logical structure should be understood as part of modalisation, as part of the consequent, or as an independent element. In the second part, the author analyses possible forms of inter-definability of deontic operators. Finally, some questions are raised on the conditional structure proposed (...) by Alexy for principles. (shrink)

En términos de la filosofía socrática, la doxa u opinión representa un principio vago debido a sus alcances limitados en la construcción de un conocimiento bien establecido. Sin embargo, debido a conveniencias como su facilidad de manejo, la opinión se ha extendido como mecanismo epistémico en espacios como las redes sociales, donde su uso se fomenta a través de objetos virtuales como el meme, de tal forma que se vuelve necesaria una evaluación filosófica para las nuevas formas de expresión doxástica (...) por medio del juicio y de la crítica como los procedimientos filosóficos más adecuados para confrontar sus repercusiones. (shrink)

Tras una breve consideración de las principales concepciones de la Psicología contemporánea acerca de la afectividad humana, se presenta a la Psicología integral de la persona como un meta-modelo capaz de iluminar y poner orden en el conocimiento actual acerca de los afectos. En concreto, se proponen seis aportes a la comprensión de la vida afectiva, a partir de la consideración de (1) la relación de los grados de vida humana con la afectividad, (2) la relación de la afectividad con (...) el resto de las potencias del alma, (3) la relación de los afectos entre sí, (4) la relación de los afectos con la realidad, (5) la relación de los afectos, en especial del amor-pondus, con el conjunto de la personalidad y (6) la relación de los afectos con la dimensión moral. (shrink)

El artículo propone una lectura de ciertos pasajes del juego autobiográfico de Barthes en Roland Barthes por Roland Barthes (1975), a partir de nociones presentes en el ensayo de Paul de Man, "La autobiografía como desfiguración" (1979). Desde las figuras de la retórica uno y desde la refor-mulación..

Self-control is deemed crucial for reasons-responsive agency and a key contributor to long-term wellbeing. But recent studies suggest that effortfully resisting one’s temptations does not contribute to long-term goal attainment, and can even be harmful. So how does self-control improve our lives? Finding an answer requires revising the role that overcoming temptation plays in self-control. This paper distinguishes two forms of self-control problems: temptation (the presence of a strong wayward motivation) and apathy (the lack of commitment-advancing motivation). This distinction makes (...) it possible to separate negative self-control (aimed at overcoming temptation) from positive self-control (aimed at overcoming lack of motivation). The paper argues that temptation should not play a central role in our conception of self-control, since overcoming temptation is neither necessary nor sufficient for successful self-control. (shrink)

La hipótesis que aquí se plantea es que la pandemia puso a cada persona en situación de tener que aprender una forma de convivir con la enfermedad, y con las medidas excepcionales interpuestas por los estados, para paliar las consecuencias de esta epidemia mundial. En ese sentido, la enfermedad del SARS-CoV-2 no ha pasado solo como una prueba a nivel sanitario, sino también a nivel personal, educativo y existencial. En esta línea se sostiene que una educación de calidad no es (...) sólo una educación medida en términos matemáticos y estadísticos, sino, y, sobre todo, en términos de escucha y obediencia de la necesidad del otro. La calidad del hecho educativo pasa por una cualidad entitativa y no por una mera calidad formal, por ser y no por tener. (shrink)

Rastrear los diferentes sentidos de lo público en la historia de la humanidad, es entrar en un terreno marcado por la polémica. Sus raíces y huellas son posibles de encontrar en la polis griega como en la res pública romana. Su fisonomía moderna está marcada, sin duda, por el pensamiento de Inmanuel Kant, quien de alguna manera delimitará el debate, que continuará en las reflexiones seminales de Jurgen Habermas sobre la esfera pública o en la crítica de Hannah Arendt a (...) la distinción entre .. (shrink)

Scholarship on Aristotle’s theory of action has recently veered toward an intellectualist position, according to which reason is in charge of setting the goals of action. This position has recently been criticized by an anti-intellectualism revival, according to which character, and not reason, sets the goals of action. I argue that neither view can sufficiently account for the complexities of Aristotle’s theory, and suggest a middle way that combines the strengths of both while avoiding their pitfalls. The key problem for (...) intellectualism is that Aristotle explicitly states reason cannot set the goals of action. The key problem for anti-intellectualism is that he also holds that the soul’s rational part must guide and prescribe over the non-rational part. I propose indirect intellectualism, a promising middle path. (shrink)